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Abstract: The Brazilian municipalities show an enormous inequality on its development level. Even within the states 
considered relatively prosperous, there are huge internal disparities on income levels. The richest Brazilian municipality‟s 
GDP per capita is about 190 times greater than the poorest municipality‟s, according to IBGE  (2000) database. A possible 
explanation for this phenomenon relies on institutional theory. Many theoretical and empirical studies, mainly based on 
cross-country data, emphasize the role played by institutions on the determination of long run development.  Nevertheless, 
there still is little research concerning the income differences   within the national territory and its connection to institutional 
quality. The literature points out that institutions matter for the level of economic development because of their effects on 
political power distribution, generation of economic opportunities, innovation, human capital accumulation, and so on. 
Based on this assumption, the present study main goal is to analyze the effects of Brazilian municipalities‟ institutional 
quality on their GDP per capita levels.  The results indicate that institutions are relevant and its importance is greater for 
large municipalities. On the other hand, human capital human capital is more important to small municipalities. To address 
the endogeneity problem inherent to the relationship between institutions and development, we employ the 2SLS method.  
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Given the large disparities observed in the income level across countries, several studies attempt to 
explain the determinants of economic growth. What factors are responsible for raising the standard of 
living in a society? Why are some countries  rich while others have remained stagnant with a lower 
level  of  income?  The  difference  in  the  level  of  income  per  capita  is  noticeable  not  only  among 
countries, but also in different regions within the same terriroty. In the Brazilian case, for example, the 
per capita income divergence between the richest and poorest municipalities is over 190 times. 
 
One possible explanation for these disparities in income levels refers to the difference in institutional 
quality between regions. Several  empirical studies found a high correlation between the degree of 
institutional development and GDP per capita. The theory suggests that institutions affect the level of 
income  through  the  distribution  of  political  power,  the  security  of  property  rights,  by  generating 
economic opportunities, stimulating innovation, fostering human and physical capital accumulation, 
and  other  ways.  Although  the  cross-country  analysis  has  thrown  light  on  various  aspects  of  the 
relationship between institutions and economic development, today there is much debate about the 
effects of institutional quality on income level of different regions within a country [Pande and Udry, 
2006]. 
 
Given the existence of several candidates to explain income differential between regions, a relevant 
question would be:  in what extent does the current political and economic institutions affect economic 
performance in a region? At this point we have an important econometric problem: the institutions 
endogeneity issue. After all, one can argue that the degree of development of a particular region has an 
important  role  on  its  institutions  development.  To  address  this  problem,  several  empirical  studies 
instrument institutional quality proxies through geographical and historical variables that are correlated 
with  the  formers  because  of  the  institutional  legacy  coming  from  initial  factor  endowments  and 
colonization mode [Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2004), Engerman and Sokoloff 
(2002), Hall and Jones (1999), Easterly and Levine (2002)]. 
 
To measure the municipalities‟ institutional framework relevance on their income levels is critical as 
support  for  public  policies  that  aim  both  economic  growth  and  regional  income  distribution 
improvement. With this background, the main goal of the present study is to measure the relationship 
between  institutional  quality  and  GDP  per  capita  of  Brazilian  municipalities.  As  a  proxy  for 
institutional quality, we adopted the Municipal Institutional Quality Indicator (MIQI) elaborated by the 
Brazilian Planning Ministry. Furthermore, as is customary in this literature, we adopted the following 
instruments  to  measure  institutional  quality  of  the  municipalities:  1)  latitude;  2)  average  annual 
temperature; and 3) average annual rainfall. According to the best of our knowledge, we are not aware 
of other study that has taken the same approach for the Brazilian municipalities. The great advantage of 
our set of instruments is that they are available for most municipalities, thus increasing the degrees of 
freedom and the results reliability compared to past studies in the same subject. 
 
The econometric results illustrate that differences in municipal institutions are crucial to understanding 
the  diversity  of  per  capita  income  among  Brazilian  municipalities.  They  are  consistent  with  other 
empirical studies employing Brazilian‟s datasets, such as those of Naritomi (2007) for the Brazilian 
municipalities  and  of  Menezes-Filho  et  al.  (2006)  for  the  Brazilian  states.  Our  results  are  also  in 3 
 
conformity with those obtained in the international literature comparing different countries [Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2004), Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) and Hall and Jones (1999)]. 
 
Besides this introduction, the present paper has four additional sections. The second one introduces a 
review  of  theoretical  and  empirical  studies  that  deal  with  the  concept  of  institutions  and  their 
relationship with long run economic growth, emphasizing institutional differences as a possible cause 
of income levels discrepancies in different regions within the national territory. The following section 
provides a description of the variables, the data source, the specification and the estimation method 
applied. Section 4 empirically tests our hypothesis, including the robustness of the results and the tests 
to the validity of the instruments, and the last section concludes. 
 
 
II. The Role of Institutions in Economic Growth 
 
North (1991, p. 97) defines institutions as rules formulated by mankind to shape political, economic 
and social interactions. They consist of informal constraints (customs, traditions, codes of conduct) and 
formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). According to this author, because the institutional 
framework evolution over the history of the countries drove their economic changes, it can be seen as a 
decisive ingredient into their different trajectories of growth, stagnation or decline. 
 
Institutions operate as the rules of the game in a society. Therefore, they ensure ownership rights, 
providing better or worse distribution of wealth, political power and human capital, foster or discourage 
innovation, diffusion of technology and investment in physical capital, and then influence resource 
allocation.  
  
Although there is disagreement about the various ways in which institutions can be related to economic 
activity, the basic idea emphasized in the literature is that institutions have a key role in economic 
development process. A considerable number of studies have empirically measured the relationship 
between institutions and economic growth. 
 
 
II.1 Cross country analisys 
To  measure  the  role  of  institutions  on  economic  performance  requires  carefulness,  since  most 
economically developed regions are more likely to invest in and sustain good institutional frameworks. 
That  is,  there  may  be  a  reverse  causality  between  institutions  and  economic  development.  The 
endogeneity of institutions makes it necessary to search for exogenous sources of institutional variation 
before  proceeding  with  the  empirical  analysis.  Most  of  the  literature  that  performs  cross-country 
empirical investigation searches in history and geography such exogenous sources of variation. These 
two sources are interrelated, because geographical variables determine to a large extent the economies 
evolution. As examples, there are studies that take into account the former European colonies as object 
of analysis (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 2001, 2002, Engerman, Sokoloff, 2002). 
 
The premise behind the use of variables representing earlier institutions - clearly exogenous relative to 
current countries‟ income - as an instrument for current institutions is the idea of institutional inertia, in 
which the institutions that develop, whether positive or negative for economic growth, tend to persist 
over  the  centuries.  Most  of  the  literature  on  this  topic  suggests  that  the  differences  in  initial 
endowments or geography would be decisive in shaping a country‟s institutional framework, and via 
institutional inertia, it would influence the process of economic development and per capita income 4 
 
level [Naritomi (2007)]. Therefore, the geographical characteristics have an indirect effect on economic 
performance via institutions, but not a direct influence. 
 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) studied, for instance, former European colonies in America - the New 
World - and they sought to explain the origins of economic differences among these countries. Through 
the  investigation  of  policies  and  institutions  related  to  the  suffrage,  land  ownership,  schooling, 
immigration,  and  finance,  the  authors  found  out  that  nations  showing  a  great  deal  of  inequality 
nowadays  are  those  that  had  developed  institutions  with  the  purpose  of  benefiting  an  elite  at  the 
expense of the majority of population, and that concentrated political power and access to economic 
opportunities. Moreover, the colonies that were more uniform in wealth, human capital and political 
power distribution, were the ones that at the outset established institutions more likely to generate 
opportunities  to  a  wider  segment  of  the  population.  Thus,  they  promoted  economic  growth  more 
effectively. These different dynamics provide an explanation for the persistence of high inequality 
among the New World economies. 
 
The factor endowments or initial conditions - such as soil, climate, population size and density of 
natives - were, as stated by Engerman and Sokoloff (2002), the source of inequality and they have 
shaped institutions development. Some colonies, like those that became the Caribbean and Brazil, had 
climate and soil conditions extremely favorable for the production of sugar, coffee, tobacco, and other 
highly valued goods in the world market. Additionally, they were produced more efficiently on large 
slavery plantations. For that reason, there was made extensive use of native and african slaves in those 
colonies, making it possible to achieve considerable economies of scale in the production of the above 
cited commodities. The widespread slavery contributed to the unequal distribution of wealth, human 
capital and political power in those regions. 
 
The Spanish America was also characterized by extreme inequality, which began with native labor 
exploitation for minerals extraction. There was a large contingent of natives and mestizos previously 
established in these colonies, and Spain adopted a policy of European migration restriction to them. 
Thus, natives and mestizos predominated in society. In contrast, in the North America colonies, the 
colonization process, from the outset, was mostly based on the establishment of small family farms that 
produced  mainly  grains,  employing  none  or  a  small  number  of  slaves.  These  settlements,  which 
became the United States and Canada, had no favorable climate and soil to grow crops like sugar - 
produced with large-scale slave labor - and they did not have a large native population. The society 
consisted mainly of European descent workers with a relatively homogeneous human capital level, 
which contributed to the solidification of institutions that led to widespread participation in politics and 
economic processes.  
 
Engermann and Sokoloff (2002) highlight the institutions related to education as an important link 
between the distribution of political power and economic growth. More egalitarian societies tend to 
invest more in education, and the rising levels of schooling can trigger social and economic changes 
that lead to growth, such as increased labor productivity, faster technological innovation, and greater 
popular participation in political and economic activities. 
 
Acemoglu,  Johnson  and  Robinson  (2002)  also  depart  from  European  colonization  to  investigate 
institutions development and their relationship with economic growth. They display some evidences 
that European intervention altered the colonies institutions, and these changes led to a reversal on their 
income evolution: those colonies that were relatively richer in 1500 are relatively poorer today. Due to 
the difficulty of measuring economic prosperity around 1500, the authors made use of the degree of 5 
 
urbanization  and  population  density  as  proxies.  Employing  both  proxies,  they  observe  a  negative 
relationship  between economic prosperity in  1500 and today, in  many  former European colonized 
countries,  even  when  controlling  for  a  number  of  variables  such  as  distance  from  the  equator, 
temperature, humidity, and natural resources.  
 
For the authors, the most plausible explanation for the reversal of fortune is the institutional hypothesis. 
European colonization brought about an institutional reversal by changing the organization of societies. 
Less prosperous regions - which were initially the least populated - were those in which European 
immigrants settled in relatively greater numbers and developed institutions that encouraged investment. 
The  authors  classify  them  as  private  property  institutions  that  guarantee  to  a  broader  range  of 
population access to private property, ensuring greater opportunity for investment, industrialization, 
and stimulating economic development. In contrast, on the most densely populated and prosperous 
regions  at  the  time  of  colonization,  it  was  more  profitable  for  the  colonizers  to  set  extractive 
institutions,  which  tended,  however,  to  concentrate  power  in  the  hands  of  a  small  elite,  reducing 
investment, opportunities for industrialization and economic growth. 
 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) instrumented current institutions quality by means of the 
settlers‟ potential mortality rate, on the assumption that it was the major determinant for European 
settlers‟ establishment. They believe the number of settlements was crucial for the formation of initial 
institutions and, finally, that there is a strong correlation between past and present institutions. 
  
In  line  with  Acemoglu,  Johnson  and  Robinson  (2001,  2002)  and  Engerman  and  Sokoloff  (2002) 
reasoning, Easterly and Levine (2002) also come to cross-country results unfavorable to the geographic 
hypothesis, presenting evidences that the environmental conditions effects on economic performance 
occurs  only  via  economic  institutions.  Their  results  give  support  to  the  interpretation  that  factor 
endowments  and  government  policies  have  no  direct  influence  on  economic  performance  when 
controlling  for  institutions,  while  the  later  are  statistically  significant  for  determining  economic 
development level. 
 
Hall and Jones (1999) also attribute economic performance to institutional quality. By means of a 127 
countries sample, they argue that countries reach higher GDP per capita levels when they have higher 
rates of investment in physical and human capitals, and when they use these inputs more productively. 
Nonetheless, social infrastructure is essential to accumulate factors of production. That is, the long run 
economic  growth  would  be  determined  mainly  by  the  social  infrastructure  -  defined  as  the  set  of 
institutions and government policies that shape economic environment. The authors also acknowledge 
the reverse causality problem. It is likely that countries with lower income level have fewer resources 
to develop an effective social infrastructure. To circumvent this problem, they make use of geographic 
and  linguistic  variables  as  institutional  instruments  (exogenous  in  relation  to  current  production) 
because they consider that these aspects reflect the degree in which each country has been influenced 
by Western Europe - the first region of the world to implement more effectively social infrastructure 
favorable to production. 
 
II.2. Institutional differences and income level within-country 
According to Pande and Udry (2006), the focus of empirical studies that investigate the links between 
institutional quality and economic development process should focus on micro data analysis. As stated 
by the authors, studies on institutional and economic development using intra-country databases could 
improve the understanding of the issues already discussed in the international cross-country analysis 
literature. Some authors have pointed out some empirical advantages of limiting the analysis to the 6 
 
national level: the sources of institutional variations can be more easily identified and compared in 
relation to cross-country analysis because the omitted variable bias tends to be lower in within-country 
analysis than in cross-country analysis. Additionally, some institutions may be directly comparable 
among regions or municipalities of the same country, but may not be across countries [Iyer (2003); 
Benerjee and Iyer (2004) and Jimeno (2005) cited by Naritomi (2007)]. 
 
Berkowitz and Clay (2004) study the North-America economic performance, using as  a source of 
institutional exogenous variation differences resulting from the adoption of the Civil Law (from French 
and Spanish colonists) and the Common Law (from British colonists). The analysis results indicate that 
the Common Law associated institutions tend to perform better, in terms of promoting growth. Thus, 
the initial conditions (the formation of the North American legal system) would have a significant role 
in  driving  their  states‟  legal  system  evolution,  and  hence  in  determining  the  current  economic 
development level. 
 
Turning to the Brazilian literature on the subject, Menezes-Filho et al. (2006) perform an empirical 
analysis to test if the hypotheses put forward to explain the differences in income across countries - 
such as those presented by Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002), 
Engerman and Sokoloff ( 2002) and Easterly and Levine (2002) - are valid to explain differences in 
income per capita level among the Brazilian states. Their results support the view that institutions do 
play an important role in explaining Brazilian states income per capita disparities. Additionally, their 
results points to a strong positive correlation between institutional quality and GDP per capita, even 
when one takes into consideration the reverse causality between both variables. The authors utilize a 
range of past  period  variables that have strong correlation  with  current  institutional quality as the 
proportion  of  illiterates  (negative  correlation),  the  proportion  of  voters,  and  the  proportion  of 
immigrants  (positive correlation). The  Brazilian southern states  had lower proportion  of illiterates, 
larger number of electoral votes and a higher proportion of foreign immigrants. There was a positive 
correlation  between  latitude  and  current  institutions  and,  therefore,  between  latitude  and  GDP  per 
capita. Using the latitude - strongly correlated with institutional proxies of the past - rather than the 
quality of current institutions to explain the GDP, they avoided the institutional endogeneity problem: 
the  existing  institutions  can  be  influenced  by  current  GDP,  but  past  institutions  and  latitude  are 
certainly exogenous. 
 
Following the proposition that studies that focus on the relationship between institutions and income 
level tend to produce more reliable results when employing intra-country database , Naritomi (2007) 
carries out an investigation for the Brazilian municipalities attaining qualitative results similar to the 
ones obtained in the analysis of Menezes Filho et al. (2006). The author emphasizes that restricting the 
empirical analysis to the Brazilian territory may bring about new perspectives. Municipalities have the 
same  political  system,  a  single  idiom,  i.e.,  there  is  uniformity  on  macro  institutions  -  indexes  of 
democratization, restrictions on executive power, judicial system, among others. Since these macro 
institutions - which are widely used as sources of institutional variations in cross-country empirical 
studies - do not differ significantly within the Brazilian territory, we must identify other sources of 
disparities in economic performance of municipalities. 
 
Despite this macro institutions homogeneity, it is important to highlight that law enforcement varies 
from region to region in the same country. For example, there are different security levels for land 
ownership across Brazilian municipalities. This shows that institutional quality that actually prevail in 
each region varies, and so its impact on the level of economic development. In other words, de jure 7 
 
political  institutions,  -  as  conceptualized  by  Acemoglu,  Johnson  and  Robinson  (2004)  -  are  fairly 
constant throughout the national territory, while de facto institutions differ4. 
 
Naritomi (2007) utilizes proxies as land distribution, political concentration, management capability, 
and access to justice, to measure the quality of institutions in the empirical analysis. She instruments 
the institutional proxies via two historical episodes: the Brazilian sugarcane and gold cycles. The Two-
Stage  Least  Squares  method  results  points  to  a  relevant  effect  of  institutions  -  instrumented  by 
historical  and  geographical  variables  -  in  determining  the  per  capita  income  of  the  Brazilian 
municipalities. One drawback of this instrumental variable approach concerns the cities located far 
from where those cycles took place, especially because it is assumed that their institutions are the same. 
The direct use of geographic instruments such as latitude, average temperature, and average rainfall 
may provide a clearer idea of each municipality initial institutions. 
 
 
III.Methodology and Data 
 
Given the above mentioned advantages in using intra-country databases to investigate the relationship 
between institutions and income level, we focus our analysis on the 5,507 Brazilian municipalities in 
2000. This large sample is employed to investigate whether local institutions can affect the level of 
economic development (proxied by GDP per capita) under the same macro-institutions like the political 
and legal systems, the degree of democracy, and so on.  
 
Our  empirical  analysis  is  similar  to  the  Menezes-Filho  et  al.  (2006)  approach,  but  the  proxy  to 
institutional quality used here is more comprehensive, embracing different dimensions of institutional 
framework. Furthermore, aggregate data by state can hide internal disparities. Even inside the states 
from South and Southeast regions, considered relatively prosperous when compared to other Brazilian 
regions, there is a huge inequality in the degree of their development. Thus, using a smaller territorial 
unit – the municipality – seems more appropriate. 
 
Our explained variable is the GDP per capita. GDP and population data were obtained from Census 
2000 from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).  
 
In  order  to  test  our  hypothesis,  we  use  the  Municipality‟s  institutional  quality  indicator  (Iqim) 
calculated by the Planning, Budget and Management Ministry5 as a proxy to institutional quality. The 
indicator  consists  of  the  average  of  three  measures  of  institutional  development:  i)  Degree  of 
Participation; ii) Financial Capacity; and iii) Management Capacity. 
 
The first one indicates the extent of populational engagement in public administration. To compute this 
sub-indicator, the Ministry takes into account the number of municipal councils and its characteristics. 
The second one considers: the number of inter-municipal consortia, i.e., the association between two or 
more municipalities to provide some public services  more efficiently;  the ratio between municipal 
government debts and net revenue (excluding payroll expenses), in order to capture the municipality‟s 
                                                 
4 De facto political power is composed of political power from resource distribution, since groups that 
have financial resources have greater ease in solving their collective problems and imposing their will 
on society. 
 
5 Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão (MPOG). 8 
 
capability of paying its debt over the time; and real savings per capita. Finally, the last one indicates: 
how  recent  is  the  database  that  supports  the  IPTU  (the  Brazilian  urban  property  tax  collected  by 
municipal administration)6; the percentage of IPTU default; the number of management tools, and 
planning tools employed by the municipal government7. 
 
Many  variables  used  as  proxies  to  physical  and  human  capital  in  other  empirical  studies  are  not 
available for municipalities, but only for states or even countries. Then, as a proxy to physical capital 
we adopted the urban residential capital stock, from the Applied Economic Research Institute (IPEA). 
Human capital is represented by two distinct proxies: the human capital stock proposed by IPEA and 
the average years of schooling of the over-25-years-old population. Physical and human capital stocks 
per capita were included in the regressions as controls.8  
 
Considering that institutions can be endogenous in the sense that richer municipalities can be more 
capable of and more interested in promoting better institutions,  the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
method used to estimate the impact of institutions over the income is not appropriate because the OLS 
estimators  are biased and inconsistent. In this case, the Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) is more 
suitable. Many empirical studies have recently emphasized that initial factor endowments are the main 
determinant of early (and long-lasting) institutions. For this reason, geographical variables can be used 
as instruments for quality of currently institutions (Hall e Jones, 1999; Engerman e Sokoloff, 2002; 
Easterly e Levine, 2002; Menezes-Filho et al., 2006).  
 
In  Brazil,  we  can  observe  a  clear  geographical  pattern  concerning  institutions,  income  level  and 
education:  states  and  municipalities  situated  near  the  equator  exhibit  a  lower  level  of  the  above 
mentioned variables when compared to the ones located further south. However, it does not mean that 
geography has a direct effect on the level of development. We stress here that the only channel through 
which endowment can affect income is through its impact on the quality of early institutions, which 
according to the inertial hypothesis, tend to persist over years.  
 
It is possible that, even under the same set of macro-institutions, geographical conditions led to the 
consolidation of different de facto institutions among municipalities. In regions close to equator, with 
hot and humid climate, the activity that has developed more effectively was the agriculture based on 
large  land  properties  (plantations),  leading  to  the  establishment  of  institutions  less  favorable  to 
industrialization and development, i.e., extractive institutions that ensure economic opportunities only 
to a small fraction of society, as defined by Engerman and Sokoloff (2002). On the other hand, in the 
regions where climate was not appropriate for this kind of activity, namely the regions farther from the 
equator, the environment was more promising to the establishment of private property institutions that 
ensure economic opportunities for a broad section of the society, providing incentives to investment, 
industrialization and long-run development.  
 
                                                 
6 This database supplies necessary information for the IPTU calculus, namely which areas are subject 
to this kind of taxation and the estimated value of the properties that will be taxed. The municipal 
administration must constantly update the database in order to establish fair taxation.   
7  Management tolls:  existence of district  administration and administrative regions, Subprefecture, 
master plan, land subdivision law, zoning law or equivalent, building codes and posture code. Planning 
instruments: existence of government plan, strategic plan and „organic law‟. 
8  In  some  specifications,  human  capital  stock  was  treated  as  endogenous  and  thus  was  instrumented  in  first  stage 
regressions. By doing this we address the Glaeser critique. 
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To address the endogeneity problem, the geographical variables included in the first stage regressions 
as instruments for the institutional quality indicator were: i) the absolute value of latitude, representing 
the  distance  from  the  equator;  ii)  the  average  annual  rainfall  in  mm;  and  iii)  the  average  annual 
temperature  in  degrees.  The  data  were  taken  from  IPEA.  Appendix  1  summarizes  the  database 
employed and its source description. The instrumental variable that presented higher correlation with 
Iqim was latitude (-0.53). The negative sign indicates that the closer the municipality is to the equator, 
the worse is its institutional quality.  
 
The described data were employed to estimate the impact of institutions over GDP per capita in a cross 
section of Brazilian municipalities in 2000. The 2SLS regressions specifications were the following: 
 
First stage:       
 
Second stage:    
 
where  is  the institutional  quality indicator  for the municipality  i,   is  a set  of instrumental 
variables,   is the proxy for capital stock per capita and   is either the proxy for human capital stock 
per capita or average years of schooling. On the second stage,    is per capita GDP and   is 
the predicted value of Iqim in the first stage. The error terms in first and second stage regressions are   
and   respectively.  
 
IV. Empirical results 
 
Table 1 introduces the descriptive statistics of the variables. Complete descriptions of all variables (and 
their  respective  sources)  are  in  the  appendix.  It  is  worth  noting  the  enormous  disparities  between 
Brazilian localities. The GDP per capita difference between the richest and the poorest municipalities is 
about 190 times. Similar disparities are also present in both the human capital stock per capita and the 
physical capital stock per capita across municipalities. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 




Minimum  Maximum 
h   24.312  (5.816)  5507  11.153  59.520 
k   3.050  (2.339)  5506  0.045  19.210 
GDP per capita  4.136  (4.772)  5507  0.641  123.701 
latitude  16.417  (8.226)  5507  0.038  33.691 
rain  116.108  (36.603)  4974  28.870  282.433 
temp  22.730  (2.987)  4974  14  28.041 
pop  30,833.3  (186,750.6)  5507  795  1.04e+07 
iqim  3.026  (0.552)  5506  1  4.9 10 
 
 
Table 2 presents the OLS regressions. In all regressions h per capita and k per capita are important 
determinants of the GDP per capita. However, the inclusion of the proxy for the institution‟s quality 
(iqim) decreases the magnitude of the effect of h over GDP per capita. It is important to stress that the 
effect of iqim over GDP per capita is always positive and statistically significant. According to Table 2, 
an increase by 1 point in iqim raises the GDP per capita of the municipality between R$ 1,031 and R$ 
1,269. Since the average GDP per capita is equal to R$ 4,136 an increase by 1 point in iqim‟s average 
is able to increase the GDP per capita average by an value between 24.9 and 30.7 percent. 
In the literature about institutions a common claim refers to the endogeneity problem. That is, the 
processes through which institutions are formed are not exogenous. The quality of institutions would be 
dependent on income per capita, so it would be endogenous. Our approach to overcome this problem is 
to  instrument  IQIM  by  clearly  exogenous  variables  as  latitude,  average  temperature  (temp)  and  a 
pluviometric index (rain). In the last column of Table 2, it is possible to verify that all instruments are 
positively and significantly correlated to GDP per capita.   
 
Table 2: OLS Regressions. Dependent variable: GDP per capita*  
Dependent variable is GDP per capita in 2000 (thousands) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
h 
0.2559  0.3179  0.1841  0.1567  0.1018 
(0 .0187)***  (0.0115)***  (0.0197)***  (0.0203)***  (0.0217)*** 
k (2000) 
0.3733    0.3853  0.38405  0.4969 
(0.0465)***    (0.0461)***  (0.0460)***  (0.0479)*** 
latitude 
      0.0483  0.1123 
      (0.0092)***  (0.0171)*** 
rain 
        0.0079 
        (0.0016)*** 
temp 
        0.2001 
        (0.0410)*** 
pop 
        -5.67e-07 
        (3.07e-07)** 
iqim 
  1.2698  1.2947  1.0313  1.0560 
  (0.1221)***  (0.1215)***  (0.1313)***  (0.1368)*** 
const. 
-3.2262  -7.4374  -5.4347   -4.7601   -10.4578 
(0.3465)***  (0.3233)***  (0.4011)***  (0.4205)***  (1.1810)*** 
observ.  5,506  5504  5503  5503  4971 
adj. R
2  0.2281  0.2341  0.2436  0.2471  0.2635 
***  significant at 1%;  **  significant at 5%;  *  significant at 10%. h is municipality human capital per capita in 2000, k (2000) is 
municipality physical capital per capita in 2000, latitude is municipality distance from equator in module, rain is a pluviometric index, 
temp is a index for municipality mean temperature, pop is municipality population in 2000, iqim is the municipality institutional proxy, 
const is the regression intercept, observ. is the observations number, and adj. R
2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination. 
 
To  address  this  issue  Table  3  presents  the  results  by  instrumental  variables  regressions.  Iqim  is 
instrumented by the three above mentioned exogenous variables and test diagnostics are presented at 
the end of Table 3.  
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (DWH) verifies the endogeneity of the iqim. A rejection of the null 
hypothesis indicates that iqim must be treated as endogenous. The Sargan test (Sargan) verifies the 
quality of the instruments, wherein a rejection of the null casts doubt on their validity. The Anderson 
canonical correlation test (ACC LR) verifies whether the equation is identified, that is, whether the 11 
 
excluded instruments are relevant (correlated with the endogenous regressors). A rejection of the null 
indicates that the model is identified. To test for the presence of weak instruments we present Stock and 
Yogo (2005) critical values (SY) for the Cragg-Donald F statistic. A rejection of the null indicates that 
the instruments are not weakly identified. 
In the first column, the only instrumented variable is iqim. The 2SLS regression results suggest that 
human capital has a smaller impact than OLS results while the opposite holds for iqim. Nevertheless, 
Sargan‟s test indicates that fitted iqim in the second stage is still correlated to the regression residuals. 
Because all variables that are not  considered endogenous in the 2SLS regression are employed as 
instruments in the first stage, one possible explanation is that human capital is also an endogenous 
variable, explaining the correlations between fitted iqim and the regression residuals. If this is the case, 
it is appropriate to instrument human capital, as well. 
In the next six specifications of Table 3, both human capital and iqim are instrumented by latitude, rain 
and temperature. In columns (2) to (7), the results indicate that human capital has a significant positive 
effect on GDP per capita and its magnitude is more important than we could conclude when it was not 
instrumented, and its coefficient is fairly stable, except in column (6). Physical capital has a negative 
effect and is significant in almost all regression results. The difference between columns (2) and (3) 
results is that the physical capital proxy is lagged in the latter (1991 values) to control for reverse 
causality. The results remain quite stable with this change. 
The 2SLS regressions suggest a slightly lower effect of iqim over GDP per capita, except in the results 
presented in columns (4) and (6), but its coefficient is not significant in the latter. Relying in which set 
of regressors is considered more appropriate, the effect of iqim ranges  from R$ 804 to R$ 2,215, 
excluding the results of columns (1) and (6). These values imply that an increase in the average iqim by 
1 point is able to enhance the average GDP per capita between 19.4 and 53.5 percent. Because the iqim 
effects in GDP per capita are closer to the former one in most specifications (19.4%), the instrumented 
variables results indicate, as expected, that institutions have a smaller impact on GDP per capita when 
one controls for the reverse causality problem.  
The regressions results illustrated in columns (4) to (6) indicate that the instruments have no direct 
impacts on GDP per capita because their coefficients are not statistically different from zero when their 
influence on institutions are taken into account. In addition, Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests (DWH) point to 
the endogeneity of institutions and human capital, Anderson canonical correlation tests (ACC LR) are 
evidence  for  relevant  excluded  instruments,  Stock  and  Yogo  critical  values  (SY)  indicates  that 
instruments are not weak, and Sargan tests point that fitted values of the endogenous variables are not 

















Table 3: IV Regressions. Dependent variable: GDP per capita* (iqim=latitude) 
Dependent variable is GDP per capita in 2000 (thousands) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
h   0.0871  0.5189  0.4687  0.5164  0.4969  0.0516  0.5138 
(0.0258)***  (0.0741)***  (0.0729)***  (0.0752)***  (0.0754)***  (0.3531)  (0.0739)*** 
k (2000)  0.4321  -0.2641    -0.3201  -0.2133  0.3190  -0.2243 
(0.0475)***  (0.1218)**    (0.1293)**  (0.1261)*  (0.4489)  (0.1206)* 
k (1991)      -0.2664         
    (0.1465)*         
latitude        -0.0438       
      (0.0301)       
rain          0.0027     
        (0.0018)     
temp            0.2619   
          (0.1927)   
pop              -8.89e-07 
            (3.15e07)*** 
iqim  2.8702  0.8966  1.0089  2.2157  0.8046  5.9521  0.81488 
(0.3285)***  (0.4605)**  (0.5607)*  (1.020)**  (0.4628)*  (3.7533)  (0.4623)* 
const.  -8.074  -10.505  -10.051  -13.546  -10.161  -22.173  -10.228 
(0.6820)***  (0.7952)***  (0.7529)***  (2.2420)***  (0.8255)***  (8.6286)***  (0.7886)*** 
Obser.  4971  4971  4489  4971  4971  4971  4971 
Adj. R
2  0.2308  0.2066  0.2199  0.1850  0.2131  0.0690  0.2095 
DWH a  26.7735  67.9219  65.1513  43.6170  48.33325  67.14461  62.8632 
(p-value)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Sargan b  42.195  2.169   1.652  0.000  0.000  0.000  3.053 
(p-value)  (0.0000)  (0.1408)  (0.1986)  EEIe  EEIe  EEIe  (0.0806) 
ACC LR c  825.984  298.029  230.921  97.678  297.567  7.204  296.724 
(p-value)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0073)  (0.0000) 
S.Y. d  299.162  102.278  78.900  49.272  153.172  3.601  101.797 
Ho at 10 %  13.43  13.43  13.43  7.03  7.03  7.03  13.43 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. In column (1) iqim is instrumented by latitude, rain, temp, h and k in 
2000. In column (2) iqim and h are instrumented by latitude, rain, temp and k in 2000. In column (3) iqim and h are instrumented by 
latitude, rain, temperature, and k in 1991. In columns (4), (5) and (6) iqim and h are instrumented by latitude, rain, temperature, and k in 
2000. In columns (7) iqim and h are instrumented by latitude, rain, temperature, pop., and k in 2000. a: the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for 
endogeneity. A rejection of the null indicates that iqim must be treated as endogenous. b: the Sargan test that verifies the quality of the 
instruments. A  rejection of the null casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. c: the Anderson canonical correlation test that verifies 
whether the equation is identified. Rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. d: the Stock and Yogo critical values for the 
Cragg-Donald F statistic. A rejection of the null indicates that the instruments are not weakly identified. Values in brackets are standard 
deviations. e: EEI means Equation Exactly Identified. 
 
Table 4 presents the IV regressions in the logarithm of the variables. The specifications are the same as 
in  Table  3,  but  the  variables  are  in  natural  logarithm,  so  the  coefficients  can  be  interpreted  as 
elasticities. In column (1), iqim is the only instrumented variable, and the Sargan test points toward a 
correlation between fitted iqim values and the regression residuals. In the next specifications, both 
human capital and institutions are instrumented, and this seems to solve the endogeneity problem. After 
this change, there is no correlation between fitted iqim and h with regression residuals. 13 
 
The regressions results are evidence of the relevance of human capital in the determination of Brazilian 
municipalities‟ income per capita. A 1 percent increment in h increases GDP per capita between 3.76 
and 4.12 percent, excluding column (6) results. A similar increase in k has an effect of reducing GDP 
per capita from 0.57 to raising it to 0.45 percent, in the last column. However, the Sargan test indicates 
that the inclusion of pop as a regressor in the second stage (results in the last column) and as an 
instrument in the first stage turns the instrumented variables from exogenous to endogenous, biasing 
the estimated coefficients. 
 Table 4 gives a better idea of the importance of the quality of the institutions to improve income. 
Excluding results from columns (1) and (6), a 10 percent increase in institutions proxy generates an 
improvement in GDP per capita between 11.8 and 15.0 percent. The effects of institutions are relatively 
stable over the distinct specifications, which indicate the results robustness. Once more, the regressions 
results illustrated in columns (4) to (6) point out that each instrument has no direct effects o GDP per 
capita because its coefficient is not statistically different from zero when its influence on institutions 
are taken into account. 
 
Table 4: IV Regressions in Log. Dependent variable: LGDP per capita* (Liqim=latitude Leduc) 
Dependent variable is GDP per capita in 2000 (thousands) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Log h   0.6165  4.1297  3.7651  4.1277  4.0499  5.0369  3.9069 
(0.0908)***  (0.3095)***  (0.2977)***  (0.3109)***  (0.4310)***  (3.6476)  (0.2845) 
Log k (2000)  0.1274  -0.5712    -0.5726  -0.5531  -0.6931  0.4494 
(0.0205)***  (0.0623)***    (0.06265)  (0.0923)***  (0.4924)  (0.0553)*** 
Log k (1991)      -0.3611         
    (0.0628)***         
Log latitude        -0.0059       
      (0.0230)       
Log rain          0.0104     
        (0.0396)     
Log temp            -0.4416   
          (1.7687)   
Log pop              -0.0807 
            (0.0076) 
Log iqim  3.0706  1.4664  1.1825  1.5094  1.476  0.2582  1.1823 
(0.1531)***  (0.2043)***  (0.2342)***  (0.2635)***  (0.2062)***  (4.8433)  (0.1978)*** 
Const.  -4.293  -13.085  -12.054  -13.108  -12.907  -13.1616  -11.411 
(0.2046)***  (0.7682)***  (0.7333)***  (0.7768)  (1.0165)***  (-13.161)***  (0.6794)*** 
Obser.  4971  4971  4489  4971  4971  4971  4971 
Adj. R
2  0.3498  0.3479  0.4366  0.3425  0.3592  0.2865  0.4274 











4  (p-value)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Sargan b  141.594  0.068  0.887  0.000  0.000  0.000  8.279 
(p-value)  (0.0000)  (0.7939)  (0.3463)  EEIe  EEIe  EEIe  (0.0040) 
ACC LR c  609.094  214.283  163.513  181.424  136.101  0.630  211.376 
(p-value)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.4274)  (0.0000) 
S.Y. d  215.733  72.916  55.447  92.295  68.921  0.315  71.891 
Ho at 10 %  9.08  13.43  13.43  7.03  7.03  7.03  13.43 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. In column (1) lniqim is instrumented by lnlatitude, lnrain, lntemp, lnh 
and lnk in 2000. In column (2) lniqim and lnh are instrumented by lnlatitude, lnrain, lntemp and lnk in 2000. In column (3) lniqim and lnh 14 
 
are instrumented by lnlatitude, lnrain, lntemperature, and lnk in 1991. In columns (4), (5) and (6) lniqim and lnh are instrumented by 
lnlatitude, lnrain, lntemperature, and lnk in 2000. In columns (7) lniqim and lnh are instrumented by lnlatitude, lnrain, lntemperature, 
lnpop, and and lnk in 2000. a: iDurbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity. A rejection of the null indicates that iqim must be treated as 
endogenous. b: the Sargan test that verifies the quality of the instruments. A  rejection of the null casts doubt on the validity of the 
instruments. c: the Anderson canonical correlation test that verifies whether the equation is identified. A rejection of the null indicates that 
the model is identified. d: the Stock and Yogo critical values for the Cragg-Donald F statistic. A rejection of the null indicates that the 
instruments are not weakly identified. Values in brackets are standard deviations. e: EEI means Equation Exactly Identified. 
 
Table  5  sort  the  sample  by  population  size.  One  important  finding  is  that  human  capital  is  more 
important to small municipalities. Its effect on GDP per capita rises when municipalities‟ inhabitants 
range from 5,000 to 20,000; and declines greatly for municipalities over 50,000. However, Stock and 
Yogo critical values indicate that the instruments are not weakly identified when it is considered just 
the  municipalities  over  50,000  inhabitants  –  columns  (4)  and  (5).  Because  only  human  capital 
coefficients turn out to be not statistically different from zero, the instruments are weakly identified 
only with human capital in those municipalities. Iqim‟s coefficients remain statistically different from 
zero and its influence on income per capita rises with municipalities‟ size.  
In fact, the quality of the municipality institutions is always an important determinant of the GDP per 
capita. However, this importance is greater for large municipalities. When they have less than 20,000 
inhabitants, an increment of 1 percentage point in iqim has a less than proportional positive impact on 
GDP per capita. For municipalities over 50,000 inhabitants, the same percentage increase in iqim has a 
positive impact of about 3.5 percent. 
Sargan tests reveal that physical capital in 1991 is a better instrument than physical capital in 2000, as 
expected, mainly for small municipalities. In addition, Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests (DWH) point to the 
endogeneity of institutions and human capital, and Anderson canonical correlation tests (ACC LR) are 
evidence for relevant excluded instruments. 
Table 5: IV Regressions. Dependent variable: GDP per capita* (iqim= educ pop) 
Dependent variable is GDP per capita in 2000 (thousands) 
Varia
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































3  *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. In all columns lniqim is instrumented by lnlatitude, lnrain, lntemp, lnh 
and lnk in 2000, in the left and lniqim is instrumented by lnlatitude, lnrain, lntemp, lnh and lnk in 1991, in the right. a: Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test for endogeneity. A rejection of the null indicates that iqim must be treated as endogenous. b: the Sargan test that verifies the 
quality of the instruments. A  rejection of the null casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. c: the Anderson canonical correlation test 
that verifies whether the equation is identified. Rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. d: the Stock and Yogo critical 
values for the Cragg-Donald F statistic. A rejection of the null indicates that the instruments are not weakly identified. Values in brackets 
are standard deviations.  
 
 
V. Concluding remarks 
 
The idea that a country‟s institutional framework is an important element to promote its development 
has gained attention recently. The empirical literature do test this hypothesis has growth rapidly  (Hall 
& Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001, 2002, Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002; Easterly & 
Levine, 2002; Menezes-Filho et al., 2006; Naritomi, 2007). Although, the research concerning the 
relationship between these two variables employing intra-country databases is on the onset  
Analyzing a sample of  the 5507 Brazilian municipalities in  2000, and being  aware of the macro-
institutions homogeneity along the national territory, the results suggests that local institutions matter to 
the GDP per capita level determination, even when the causality problem is taken into consideration.   
It is also important to highlight that the regressions results suggests that each instrument has no direct 
effects  on  GDP  per  capita  because  its  coefficient  is  not  statistically  different  from  zero  when  its 
influence on institutions are taken into account. This result favors the institutional approach. 
Moreover,  institutional  quality  seems  to  be  more  essential  in  greater  municipalities.  One  potential 
explanation for this result is that informal institutions matters in small municipalities because people 
now each other, while in bigger cities formal institutions have a more important role. On the contrary, 
human capital is more important in small ones. A possibility to explain this phenomenon is that the 
instruments are weakly identified with human capital only in bigger municipalities. 
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Table 6:  Data description 
Variable  Description  Source 
h   Human capital stock, estimated as the expected 
present value of annual earnings (discounted at 
10%  per  year)  associated  with  education  and 
experience (age) of working-age population (15 
to 65 years), per capita. 
IPEA 
k (2000)  Urban residential capital stock per capita in 2000  IPEA 
k (1991)  Urban residential capital stock per capita in 1991  IPEA 
GDP per capita  Gross domestic product per capita  IBGE 
Latitude  Absolute  value  of  latitude  representing  the 
distance from equator 
IPEA 
Rain  Average annual rainfall in mm  IPEA 
Temp  Average annual temperature in degrees  IPEA 
Iqim  Municipality‟s institutional quality indicator  MPOG 
Pop  Municipality‟s  population  according  to  Censo 
2000 
IBGE 




Table 7:  Source description 
IBGE  Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística) 
IPEA  Applied Economic Research Institute (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica 
Aplicada) 
MPOG  Planning,  Budget  and  Management  Ministry  (Ministério  do 
Planejamento, Orçamento  Gestão) 
 
 
 